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Bernard E. Rollin, Animal Rights and Human Morality
(Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1981)
Professor Rollin is well known to
most readers of this journal, at least
by name and· reputation. He has logged more miles and spoken· to more
people on behalf of animals than any
other philosopher I can thin k of, save
Peter Singer. Now Rollin has brought
out a book.
I think it is a very good
book, one that should be read by
anyone who is in any way concerned
with animals.
Unfortunately, I fear
that many who should learn from this
book will not.

Animal Rights and Human Morality
is divided into four parts.
Part one
j s "Mo r a I T heo ryan dAn ima Is. "
It is
a 65-page sketch of a moral theory
and
its
application·
to
animals.
Although the theory is interesting and

suggestive, philosophers will complain
that it is not presented in enough
detail. Non -ph ilosophers will probably
think that it is boring and nit-picking. Part Two is "Animal Rights and
Legal Rights."
Here Rollin reasons
from premises supplied . by Ronald
Dworkin to the conclusion that if the
moral claims of Part One are true,
animals
should
be
granted
legal
rights.
Philosophers will be bothered
by
Rollin's
apparently
uncritical
acceptance of Dworkin's views on the
relation between morality and law.
Non-philosophers are apt to think that
the claim this section is meant to
establish is obvious.
Part Three is
"The Use and Abuse of Animals in
Research." This is the best part of a
very good book. Not on Iy is the main
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theme of the ethics of animal experimentation treated in an interesting
and competent way, but there are also
stimulati ng asides on science education, the role of humanists in science,
science policYi and general issues in
philosophy of science.
At least one scientist has al ready
responded hysterically to Rollin's cri. tique, and at least one animal rights
advocate has accused Rollin of lacking
moral purity, as we shall see below.
Part Four is "Morality and Pet Animals. " To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first time a philosopher has
treated this subject at any length.
Li ke puppies and kittens, this section
should win the affection of almost
everyone.
So what is the problem? Here is a
very good book that many people who
should know better will ignore or dislike.
Why?
Rollin does not conform to the
standa rd stereotypes.
Neither do his
views. He is neither a "sadistic vivisectionist"
nor a
"bleeding
heart
humaniac." He is an "analytic" philosopher who became interested in the
moral
status
of
animals
while
researching an earlier book on philosophy of language.
He has also published ·extensively on the eighteenthcentu ry German ph ilosopher, Immanuel
Kant, and Kant's influence on Rollin's
views in moral philosophy is quite
clear.
But in addition to his background in analytic philosophy, Rollin
is also a Professor of Physiology and
Biophysics.
He
regularly
teaches
veterinary medical ethics in a College
of Veterinary Medicine, and he coteaches a year-long honors course in
basic biology.
In short, he seems
neither fish nor fowl.
He is, perhaps, too sympathetic to science for
those in the humane movement, and
too sympathetic to animals for those in
the sciences; and too sympathetic to
both science and. animals for many
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philosophers.
That this is so can be seen by
examining two recent reviews of Animal Rights and Human Morality.
The
first appeared in the New England
Journal of Medicine for May 27, 1982.
It was written by Mau rice B. Visscher
(M.D., Ph.D.) of. the University of
Minnesota. Visscher writes:
Rollin has attempted to demolish all the ethical bases that
have been used to justify the
humane use of lower animals.
Ethics and morals are notorious
for thei r dependence on some
agreed-on basic assumptions.
Rollin states his own position
on morals in a very dogmatic
fashion. (p. 1303)
Visscher seems to misu nderstand the
nature of ethics and moral philosophy.
First, ethics is not "notorious" for its
dependence on shared basic assumptions.
The mai nstreams of both the
Kantian and Utilitarian traditions hold
that what is right and good is utterly
independent of what people think is
right and good, or what people's
"agreed on basic assumption (s)" may
be.
Contraetarians would disagree,
but that is not surprising. Questions
about the fou ndations of eth ics and
morality are philosophical questions,
resolvable only by philosophical dialogue and rational discourse.
This
leads us to a second interesting claim
that Rollin
in the quoted passage:
states his own position in a dogmatic
fashion.
In truth, like most philosophers, Rollin gives arguments and
adduces considerations for· his views.
One may challenge the cogency of
Rollin's arguments, but it would be
fatuous· or worse to deny their existence.
Perhaps Visscher thinks that
the assertion of any moral views,
especially
unconventional
ones,
is
"dogmatic."
God forbid he should
stumble into a class on moral philosophy.
Not only would he see "dogmatism," but competing "dogmatisms" in
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conflict.
Visscher

goes

on to

Humane Society of the United
States to ensure its publication. (p. xii)

say:

The author is somewhat less
candid about the sponsorship
under which he writes.
Only
by careful
reading of the
introduction does
it become
evident that this work was
subsidized
by
the
Humane
Society of the United States.
This organization is familiar to
scientists as a vigorous opponent of animal experimentation
(p. 1303)
Here there are several falsehoods
strung together in the service of a
bad argument.
The

humane

society

IS

evi I.

Rollin's work was "subsidized"
by the Humane Society.
Therefore,
evil.

Rollin's

Arguments of this
become fashionable.
example:
Communists

are

work

is

form have again
Here is another
evil.

The nuclear freeze campaign is
supported by communists.
Therefore, the nuclear freeze
campaign is evil.
But the logic of the a rgument aside,
Visscher simply has his facts wrong.
Rollin is very straightforward about
his association with the Humane Society.
He writes:
I am especially grateful to John
Hoyt, president of the Humane
Society of the United States,
for his commitment to this
book, and for his willingness
to provide the support of the

It is not clear from this passage what
financial relationship, if any, exists
between Rollin and HSUS.
(Perhaps
Visscher knows something we don't.)
I would be willing to bet, however,
that while Rollin's research is "subsidized," Visscher's
is "supported."
(See Rollin's chapter on "The Debasement
of
Language
in. Science. It)
Moreover, it comes as a surprise to
me to lea rn that HSUS is a "vigorous
opponent of animal experimentation."
I thought they were a mi Id supporter
of some restrictions on some research
involving animals.
Perhaps that is
enough in Visscher's circles to be
counted as a "vigorous opponent of
animal experimentation."
Visscher quotes Rollin· as making
the familiar
point,
reminiscent of
Plato, that if power confers moral
legitimacy, then it would follow that
the monstrous actions of the Nazis
wou Id have been morally legitimate.
This, of course,
is an argument
against the thesis that power confers
moral legitimacy. Visscher writes:
Although Rollin does not exonerate the Nazis, in effect he
does so by comparing the killing of lower animals for science
with the atrocities of the Holoca u st. ( p . 1303 )
In ten years of reading freshman
essays, I have never seen a m ore
egregious
misunderstanding
of
a
reductio argument.
Towards the end of his review,
Visscher tries to put Rollin's book in
perspective.
It is probably no accident that
very few persons with extensive scientific education are
activists in the animal humane
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movement . . . Few physicians
will care to read this book . .
but its appearance at this
time is evidence that the antiscience group in America is
becoming more vociferous . . .
(pp.
1303-4)

Interestingly enough, Rollin's book
provides pa rt of the answer.
To
greatly oversimplify his discussion on
pages 107 and following, scientists are
not trained to be Newtons and Einsteins, relentless questioners with a
sense of wonder about the workings of
natu re
Instead
science education
emphasizes technique, manipulation of
data, and manual dexterity at the
expense of theoretical soph istication
and originality. As Rollin writes:
0

After quoting an Associated Press
report of an Animal Liberation Front
action which liberated· a number of
laboratory animals in England,
he
informs us (again to my surprise) of
"a comparable
raid
involving the
National
Institutes
of
Health."(p.
1304) What does this have to do with
the book under review?
"Rollin's writings will give a
false cloak of morality to such
behavior." (p.
1304)
Visscher concludes with somber and
foreboding words:
Like creation science, animal
Iiberation based on speciesism
is likely to be with us for a
long time
The rational segment of society must work diligently to counter their pernicious influences on biologic
science. (p. 1304)
0

What are we to make of this? It is
not easy to respond in an open and
honest way to searching criticism,
whatever one does for a living
Even
so, there are many scientists who
would find Visscher's review as misinformed and ill-argued, not to mention
arrogant, as ,. There is an awakening
in
the
scientific
community,
bringing with it a new sense of moral
and social
responsibility, and we
would do well to remember that.
Still, there are a great many scientists who share Visscher's outlook.
Many of them are intelligent people
who are otherwise morally sensitive.
What accounts for the complete collapse of intellectual rigor when it
comes to self-examination?
0

[The u nderg raduate] tests . .
are typically short answer,
true or false,
or multiple
choice, geared to the regurgitation of discrete· bits of information. (po 108)
. . . the graduate student is
essentially handed a problem
for research by the advisor
and even handed the ground
rules for possible solutions.
This is his apprenticeship - if
he succeeds, or makes headway, he is certified as a member of the field and is entitled
to pursue these puzzles, seek
funding, and replicate himself
through his graduate students.
(p. 109)
This process leads to conformity not
only in theory and practice, but in
dress, mode of speech, professional
etiquette, carriage and deportment.
In such a context concern for animals,
and moral reflection generally, is all
too often
seen
as
sentimentality,
squeamishness, and lack of professionalism.
But scientists are not alone in failing to understand and appreciate Rollin's book.
Mort Frankel, writing in
Agenda for May/june 1982, charges
Rollin with "the exaltation of· science
over all else." (p. 29) This hardly
sounds like the same man whom
Visscher lumps with the creationists
as part of a rising tide of anti-science
hysteria.
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According to Frankel, Rollin has
written two books.
In the first "he
ably restates valuable truths that
have already been published many
times with in the last decade." (p. 30)
In the second, Rollin takes it all
back.
In support of his new position,
which adds up to experimentation-with-kindness and vivisection-when-necessary, he pleads
the importance of "habits and
traditions entrenched by time
and nurtured by expediency."
(p.
28)
Professor
Ro llin's
general
stance is that of a dedicated
team
player
who,
however
much wedded to justice, ki ndness, integrity and all laudable
things, is guided by one paramount principle:
"Don't rock
the boat."
If the benefits of
"science as we know it" conflict with what we believe is
right, then too bad about what
we believe is right.
(p. 29)
There are two kinds of responses
one could make to Frankel.
One
would consist in a philosophical discou rse on the relation of theory to
practice. It might note along the way
that the moral . theory wh ich Roll i n
sketches in Part One is not absolutist.
Rollin is a Kantian, but he is also
sensible. Although I think that ultimately such a position (sensible Kantianism) is untenable, never mind for
now.
The point is that Rollin is no
abolitionist in Part One or anywhere
else.
But discussing the issue in this
way is really to miss the point.
Rollin's book comes from a particular
institutional and theoretical locus. He
is involved in the day-to-day business
of science education. He works in an
environment in which the well-entrenched tendency is to view animals
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as disposable laboratory equipment.
Rollin is aware of the problems and
thought-patterns of working scientists. As a result he is unwilling to
accept the easy shibboleth . promulgated by so ma ny unknowledgeable
people in the animal liberation movement that alternatives to animals are
there waiting, if only nasty scientists
would avail themselves of them.
But
although Rollin sees science from the
inside, he has done more than his
share of boat-rocking (contrary to
Frankel's remark, in its own way as
arrogant as anything of Visscher's).
Unlike Rollin, most animal liberationists live and work in institutions
far removed from the pain and suffering of which they write and speak.
All too often we in the movement are
too willing to benefit from the exploitation of animals while condemning
those who. do the exploiting.
And
when we are consistent enough not to
do that, we engage in interminable
debates about moral pu rity that give
fundamentalist theology a good name
by
compa rison.
And,
as
Rollin
reminds us, the question that should
always loom before us is this:
Are
the animals better off in virtue of our
efforts? And all too often the answer
is No.
Rollin's book is important because
it speaks to all sides of these issues
from positions which they desperately
need to better appreciate.
To scientists he offers the perspective of
someone in sympathy with thei r aims
and goals, who has a moral consciousness as well, one that is rigorous and
well-argued, not syrupy and sentimental.
To animal liberationists, he
offers the perspective of someone on
the side of the angels who understands
the
practical
difficulties
involved in putting our principles into
action.
It would be a pity if a book
explicitly intended to help the animals
by p romoti ng dialogue between the
humans should fail because of the
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blindness and prejudice of both sides.
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